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Imperial liberalism and institution building at the end of empire in Africa1 
Sarah Stockwell, King’s College London 
 
 There can be few better illustrations of the reach of Western liberalism, as well as its 
contradictions and limitations, than developments associated with the end of the European 
colonial empires, including in Africa. They provide a powerful illustration of the extent to 
which in the twentieth century liberalism had become the dominant Western political 
ideology, transformed, in Duncan Bell’s words, from a ‘limited and contested position within 
political discourse’ into ‘the most authentic expression of the Western tradition or a 
constitutive feature of the West itself’.2  Once European colonial powers were forced to 
retreat they aimed to transfer power to successor states fashioned along the lines of Western 
parliamentary systems that in the British case would take their place  in the Commonwealth 
and help ensure, in the Cold War context, the preservation of British influence.3 The wheel 
had come full circle: whereas in the nineteenth century liberalism once hostile to imperialism 
had become complicit in the imposition of colonialism,4 so, in the twentieth, ideas of 
politically liberal systems underpinned efforts to transition back from ‘formal’ to ‘informal’ 
empire. 5 While  managing this transition entailed the exercise of decidedly illiberal 
authoritarian powers, the British nonetheless sought to present decolonisation as the 
culmination of a liberal imperialism. In 1947 they even commissioned the historian Sir 
Reginald Coupland to produce a short historical account of the liberal nature of British 
imperialism to show that Indian independence represented the fulfilment of the liberal, 
civilising mission ‘desired more than a century ago’.6 For their part, colonial elites bought 
into and instrumentalised these liberal discourses to advance their own objectives.7 They 
demanded independence within states and structures modelled along Western democratic 
lines, reflecting the ascendancy of discourses of self-determination and Western liberalism. 
This is despite the fact that as Emma Hunter has recently reminded us, alternative, 
conservative, forms of nationalism associated with chieftaincy had greater contemporary hold 
than historians, inclined to view nationalist politics through the lens of mid-twentieth-century 
liberalism, have sufficiently acknowledged.8  
This article engages with the theme of liberalism through analysis of British ideas 
about institution-building below the level of parliamentary democracies in Anglophone 
African states at the end of empire. Processes of institution-building and transfer (through 
‘localisation’ and the appointment of Africans to senior positions) and the successful creation 
of parastatal institutions were intimately related to the Westminster model. Sound institutions 
below the level of parliaments were crucial underpinning to the successful working of the 
Westminster system, and their political neutrality a fundamental aspect of Western, 
politically liberal systems (understood here as those in which executive power is balanced by 
that of the legislature and judiciary; the civil rights of individuals are protected by law; and in 
which institutions in civil society, such as the press, can operate free from state control).9  
Processes of institution-building have largely been discussed through the prism of 
development, including by scholars attentive to the striking parallels between discourses of 
‘good government’ prominent during decolonisation and those associated with late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century humanitarian and neo-liberal interventions overseas.10 There 
has been comparatively less attention to the ways in which institution-building served as a 
site for the articulation of political (as well as economic) liberalism.11  
This article explores the views of academics on the development of higher education 
and public administration in emergent states, and of bankers in relation to the creation of new 
central banks in former colonies.  It does not attempt to offer anything approaching a 
comprehensive survey of institution-building in these sectors. Moreover, while we focus here 
on British ideas, we should be clear that the reforming dynamic rested at least as much with 
African actors as with British, who throughout the colonial period had demanded the 
development of educational and other institutions, and the advancement of Africans within 
them, from colonial authorities that had resisted such calls, whether from self-interest or 
cultural and racial prejudice.12 Even in a new climate of modernising development from the 
1940s, as the British engaged in new processes of institution building they were generally 
still pushed into action by African, and sometimes international, pressure. A full discussion of 
the theme of institution building would also need to take in examples from other sectors, most 
obviously, legal. However, it is hoped that a focus on the quite different examples of higher 
education, administration and banking will serve to reinforce the case being made in this 
article about the pervasive influence of political liberalism on institution-building at the end 
of empire. It argues that, however instrumentally deployed, an imperial liberalism had an 
energising effect on some Britons within domestic institutions whose expertise was called 
upon to assist with the development of successor institutions in emergent states. Further, as 
these individuals engaged in a process of institution-building, they acted in ways that were 
not only determined by Western liberalism, but also by distinctively British ideas of state 
power. Nevertheless, while their approaches undoubtedly derived from deep rooted 
convictions about the kind of institutions that were essential to the operation of politically 
liberal systems, such considerations were in tension with more self-interested concerns which 
could compromise efforts to replicate British institutions.  
Anglophone Africa offers rich scope for an exploration of this theme. In the transition 
to self-government even less progress had been made with institution building and 
localisation in Britain’s African colonies than, for example, had been the case in South Asia. 
Not only did the movement to independence within a short period of time of so many 
colonies entail institution-building on an almost industrial scale, but this provided significant 
opportunity for Britons based in domestic institutions to deploy their expertise in the task. We 
should nevertheless be cautious about identifying any African particularity. One obvious 
reason for this is that the ideas and initiatives relating to institution-building discussed here 
principally through African examples were developed with reference to the dependent British 
empire in general. In some sectors, for example banking, British advisers also perceived their 
role as comparable to that they had earlier played in relation to the ‘old’ Commonwealth or  - 
like Eric Ashby, an adviser on the establishment of African universities - consciously situated 
their activities in  the longer history of the ‘export’ of British institutions that encompassed 
both settler colonies and India.13 Equally pertinent, the circumstances in which institutions 
were developed or transferred varied across the continent according to local politics and were 
the product of distinct territorially-based processes of negotiation and implementation. 
Moreover, since a process of institution-building mostly accompanied or followed some 
element of self-government and was shaped by local elites (even though generally in contexts 
in which the British retained considerable influence), the sort of distinction drawn by several 
scholars (with reference to the Westminster system in Asia) between ‘transplanted’ 
institutions in settler states and those ‘implanted’ in non-settler states is too rigid to be fully 
applicable in the case of African countries. 14 In British eyes a variety of factors also applied 
according to African states varying degrees of strategic and economic importance. But, 
perhaps less obvious, were distinctions of time. From our contemporary perspective it is easy 
to collapse the decolonisation of British African colonies into one short phase commencing 
with Ghanaian independence in 1957 and concluding (with the notable exception of 
Rhodesia, as well as the southern African high commission territories) in 1965 with that of 
the Gambia. But even as new institutions were being fashioned in some locations, others were 
being modified in those states that had already attained independence, influencing later 
British approaches.  
 
*** 
 
A process of institution building began before but more frequently (especially in East 
and Central Africa) occurred at or after constitutional independence. But its origins can be 
dated to a series of shifts that occurred in British policy in response to developments in the 
late 1930s and in the first years of the Second World War. In the 1940s doctrines of 
‘trusteeship’ and ‘indirect rule’ that had underpinned British approaches to administering 
Africa in the first half of the twentieth century were discarded in favour of new concepts of 
‘partnership’ and ‘development’. Rather than (as it had in the earlier twentieth century) 
seeking to preserve what the British identified as traditional African political institutions, 
British policy now aimed at the transformation of the colonies along British lines. The 
reasons behind this shift are well known and need not detain us long here: suffice to say that 
even before the war, problems with a system of colonial African governance based 
(theoretically) on hereditary claims to rule rather than meritocratic ones, and which vested 
authority in traditional rather than ‘new’, Western-educated, elites, were becoming apparent 
especially in increasingly urban societies. From 1947 British local government policy in 
Africa was reformed as a first step towards the development of fully-fledged parliamentary 
systems in Britain’s colonies, although in practice the pace of political change in West Africa 
at least would mean that developments at the centre would soon after outstrip those at local 
governmental level.15 Dismantling a system of ‘native administration’ based around the 
preservation of traditional African institutions and authorities that posited separate 
developmental routes had implications for other aspects of British colonial policy. For 
example, hitherto one objection to the appointment of Africans to senior positions in public 
administration had been that they would be unable to work effectively with the African chiefs 
and their advisers, in whom Britain had vested authority. This had led the British to resist the 
development of African higher education, demanded by African elites, in part because it was 
suspected that without jobs to enter (notably, in public administration) the creation of ‘new’ 
elites would ultimately foster colonial frustration and political instability. Upholding 
traditional systems had hence become one justification for Britain’s failure to do more in 
relation to the expansion of higher education within Britain’s African colonies.16  
Even before the African local government reforms, the Colonial Office was already 
revising other aspects of colonial policy relating to development and welfare in response to 
widespread unrest in British colonies in the late 1930s and past policy failures, and to present 
British rule in a more progressive and constructive light. ‘Partnership’ and ‘development’ had 
become new ways of legitimising colonialism in the face of a variety of hostile forces and 
were very consciously used to promote an acceptable face of colonialism to audiences at 
home, within the empire, and internationally.17 In summer 1943 the secretary of state for the 
colonies, Oliver Stanley, declared that the long-term objective of British policy was the 
gradual advancement of British colonies ‘along the road to self-government within the 
framework of the British Empire’.18 Paradoxically the actual process of creating liberal 
societies on British lines necessitated greater rather than less state intervention and Stanley’s 
articulation of a new imperial mission was accompanied by other initiatives relating to 
colonial development, notably, as discussed below, in respect of colonial higher education. 
Conservatism, however, still characterised, and in some cases, compromised, British 
initiatives.  
This imperial liberalism was also all too frequently accompanied by the exercise of 
illiberal powers.19  Even as in London officials were advocating partnership and 
development, in wartime South Asia some 11,700 were imprisoned, including the most senior 
officials of the Indian National Congress, following the enactment of emergency legislation 
on the outbreak of war.20 Whatever the British justification for such moves in terms of war 
and the defence of the Western liberal order, the enactment of emergency powers was 
illustrative of fundamental tensions in British political liberalism. Indeed as Terence Halliday 
and Lucien Karpik argue, while the British authorities had always insisted on the universality 
of the rule of law (a fundamental aspect of politically-liberal systems), this was compromised 
in colonial contexts by a rule of difference with parallel legal systems (in Africa, ‘native 
courts’), and also, and most critically, by reserving the right to exercise power by sovereign 
decree and to declare states of emergency that abrogated normal law and gave the state 
unfettered coercive powers.21 After the Second World War states of emergency were 
commonly used as the British sought to regain control in the face of insurgency or political 
disorder, most notably and for the greatest duration in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya.22 In this 
way rule by decree and the suspension of normal law was as much part of the political-legal 
inheritance of former British colonies on independence as liberal legal systems, with 
significant consequences for the colonies’ post-colonial trajectory.23  
However, to arrive at a richly-textured understanding of British decolonisation we 
need to incorporate a wide variety of dynamics, such as how ideas of the distinctively liberal 
identity of the British state and its relations with civil society helped shape the policies and 
responses of a range of British actors and institutions to the decolonisation process. As Emma 
Hunter observes, ‘International thought was not characterised only by the assumption that the 
international political order would and should be based on nation-states and not empires. It 
was also characterised by a set of assumptions about what kind of political society should be 
contained within the building blocks of nations, defined in terms of parliamentary democracy, 
representative government and individual rights’. 24 In British eyes this required the relative 
autonomy of institutions from the state and from political interference, and the development 
of an African, professional, middle class to fill posts within them. 25   
These are features of any liberal political system, with the political neutrality of the 
judiciary or the army essential checks on the raw political authority of states. None the less, 
these features had assumed a distinct form within the British system. Patrick Joyce suggests 
that the British state was liberal not simply because it enshrined principles of political liberty, 
but because it also allowed designated bodies to operate comparatively independently.26 We 
can see this in relation to British universities. In contrast to an American private model, 
British universities at the time were public institutions, but they had greater freedom from 
state control than public universities in most other European countries, where, Robert 
Anderson notes, the Napoleonic era left its ‘stamp’.  This is most obvious within the 
centralised and bureaucratic system of France but is evident too in the case of the older 
German universities whose financial independence was damaged by the effects of French 
conquest and occupation.  Even though in the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries the 
British state extended greater control over universities (for example as a result of the 
inauguration of student grants after the First World War), British universities still retained 
considerable autonomy.27 Within British political culture a consensus had emerged about the 
desirability of limiting state control derived in part from the cultural capital of institutions 
like Britain’s oldest universities, not least because those appointed to positions within the 
state had themselves generally been educated within them and bought into the same values. 
As Anderson further argues with reference to interwar Britain, ‘politicians and bureaucrats 
belonged to a political culture which was suspicious of the power of the state, and really did 
believe that the independence of universities was an important liberal value, a tradition to be 
cherished, and that they worked best when left to determine their own policies’.28  
As they turned to the development of institutions in emergent states, those involved 
drew on the British examples they not only knew best but that they also deemed best practice. 
In so doing they incorporated their own distinctively British ideas about the independence of 
institutions from the state. Some of the views expressed by British actors in institutions on the 
borders of the state relating to African institutional development need to be understood as 
also interventions in debates about the nature of the domestic state at a time at which -- for all 
individuals’ and institutions’ views on the nature of a politically liberal state -- saw the 
emergence of new ideas about the state’s place in the economy and society which challenged 
established assumptions about universities, the civil service, and about central banking. 
However, what might be thought of as disinterested concern with best practice - albeit that 
this was in itself a manifestation of an imperialism of knowledge derived from a presumption 
that the British knew best - was inextricably bound up with a set of other more selfish 
objectives. In their most benign form these aims embodied a vested interest in good 
governance, vital to the stability of new states within the Commonwealth and more broadly to 
Western interests in the Cold War. Engagement with institution-building overseas was crucial 
also to the British state’s claims to be a source of modernising development along Western, 
liberal lines, and, through the dissemination of British models and Britishness, to the broader 
objective of securing influence at the end of empire.29 But, whether consciously or 
unconsciously individuals based in British institutions also acted in ways that advanced their 
own narrower interests, even if they might also have conceived these as compatible with the 
best interests of emergent states.  
 
*** 
British universities and academics were one obvious source of mid twentieth-century 
liberal ideas.30  Many academics had been brought into advisory roles in relation to colonial 
policy both before the war and during it, exemplifying the state’s growing recourse to 
‘experts’ in the formulation and delivery of policy. They served on the committees and other 
specialist bodies that proliferated in the period and as advisers to the Colonial Office across a 
range of social and natural sciences.31 Some of these academics were instrumental in the 
development of new policy initiatives in relation to colonial institution-building, including, as 
discussed, higher education and administration, and were energised by the state’s articulation 
of a new liberal civilising mission. H.J. Channon, a professor of biochemistry at the 
University of Liverpool, and one of the most active members of the Colonial Office’s 
education advisory committee, pressed on the Colonial Office in 1941 the importance of 
developing colonial universities as a crucial step towards enabling colonial peoples to ‘stand 
on their own feet’. 32 At this date there were few universities anywhere in the colonial Empire 
and none in Britain’s African colonies,  although there were several higher education 
institutions.33 Margery Perham, reader in colonial administration at the University of Oxford 
argued that British universities now had a ‘more important task than any handled by the 
Colonial Office itself’ in ‘the training of their [the emergent nations’] leaders and experts so 
that they may take back from us the control of their own affairs’.34  
Channon and Perham both became central figures in metropolitan discussions around 
colonial universities. In 1943 Channon’s intervention contributed to the Colonial Office’s 
decision to appoint a commission chaired by Lord Justice Asquith to investigate higher 
education in the colonies; 35 as Tim Livsey has recently shown, developments in Africa also 
played a decisive role in the origins and shape of new initiatives relating to colonial 
universities.36 Channon and Perham were both appointed to the new Commission, while 
Channon was also a member of a separate regional commission convened a few weeks earlier 
to give consideration to higher education in West Africa (the ‘Elliot Commission’).37 When it 
reported in June 1945, the Asquith Commission recommended the formation of universities 
in the colonies and set out proposals to assist with the drafting of their founding constitutions. 
These recommendations remained the model for colonial universities until the late 1950s 
when there began to be greater reference to American experience as well as to the local 
conditions.38 The Commission also proposed the creation of a new Inter-University Council 
for Higher Education in the Colonies (later Overseas) comprising members drawn from 
British and colonial universities to assist with these tasks.39 A series of new university 
institutions followed. Via the secondment of academics to new colonial university colleges to 
facilitate their conversion to full university status, the creation of the IUC initiated a new and 
extended phase of British academic engagement with educational institutions in emergent 
states that Commission members hoped might generate close ties that would survive the 
colonies’ transition to independence.40 Margery Perham became one of the IUC’s most 
longstanding and key members. Another was Ivor Jennings, initially as a representative of the 
University of Ceylon, and, from 1948 to 1961 co-opted to the Council.41 Jennings’ career 
straddled the worlds of democracy-building on the Westminster model and of sub-
parliamentary institution building. He was the founding Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Ceylon, as well as later Master of Trinity Hall in the University of Cambridge and Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Cambridge from 1961 to 1963. He was also the foremost 
Commonwealth constitutional expert of the day and had advised on the Ceylon constitution 
as well as on constitutional issues in India, Pakistan, Malaya and Nepal.42  
Of course, there was a complexity and diversity of views within Britain and within 
single institutions. For example, some, like Perham were excited by the prospect of assisting 
the colonies to eventual self-government, whereas others remained more committed to 
upholding empire. Equally, even among those who were most committed to empire within 
the universities, there were some who doubted the universities’ capacity to participate in a 
latter-day civilising mission in this instance by making their academic staff available for 
secondment to new colonial institutions. Sir Douglas Veale, as the university’s registrar the 
most senior administrative figure at the University of Oxford, and a committed ‘empire man’, 
reminded his long-term ally and director of colonial service recruitment at the Colonial 
Office, Sir Ralph Furse, in May 1943 in connection to proposals for the ‘loan’ of university 
staff for the service of empire, that ‘the supply [of British academics] in fact is limited’. He 
feared, moreover, that ‘not every eminent scholar’ was ‘suitable for this kind of missionary 
work’. It was no use, he warned, ‘sending someone who suffers from ochlophobia’, or who 
‘is exceedingly ill-mannered, or enjoys poor health’, or even, he added, ‘a disagreeable wife 
who insists on going with him’.43  
As they engaged with the task of developing colonial universities, however, British 
academics agreed on the importance of replicating overseas the principle of academic 
freedom and university autonomy alongside other features of the British university system.44  
It was essential, the Asquith Commission noted, that the new institutions ‘should have full 
freedom to manage their own affairs’. 45  According to Perham, reflecting retrospectively on 
the deliberations of the Asquith Commission, ensuring ‘a form of university government 
which enshrined the academic freedom which we had developed in this country’ had been 
one of two overriding principles that had guided the deliberations of the Commission, 
alongside the maintenance of standards by ensuring that admission to colonial universities 
was governed by the same high entry criteria as at home in Britain.  Writing in the early 
postcolonial era, in the light of the transition away from these principles among some African 
universities, Perham wondered retrospectively if the Commission had been wrong. She 
concluded that ‘we could give only what we knew & valued’. 46 As Tim Livsey argues in a 
discussion of the development of universities in Nigeria, British university freedom was 
relative rather than absolute, as was that of the new University of Ibadan in the late colonial 
era from the British authorities.47 To an extent the Asquith recommendations had 
acknowledged the inevitability of this. ‘Colonial universities’, the Commission had proposed, 
‘should be autonomous in the sense in which the universities of Great Britain are 
autonomous’. Autonomy should not preclude a degree of public accountability nor some role 
for governments, including via the exercise of supervisory functions compatible with the 
award of state funding. Nevertheless, through appropriate checks and balances including a 
Senate which would be a purely academic body, as well as the judicious division of seats so 
that no external organisation could exercise a majority in a university’s governing council, 
the Commission believed that academic freedom would prevail. 48 British academics had also 
secured for the IUC relative autonomy from the Colonial Office (which devolved to it 
considerable authority to act in relation to the development of colonial universities).49 But 
Livsey’s comments point to the distortions that could follow from the importation of British 
models into colonial contexts. There was one set of constraints which British academics 
would probably not initially have recognised, although Eric Ashby later acknowledged the 
tensions between academic freedom and the British role: the ‘academic freedom’ of new 
universities would be mediated by the supervision of British academics, for example via the 
inclusion of one or two representatives of the IUC on the governing councils of new 
universities and via special arrangements linking new universities to the University of 
London designed to ensure the maintenance of academic standards.50 This wholesale 
adherence to British traditions and oversight by advisers who sought to instil their ideas of  
best practice was initially accepted, and even embraced, by elites in emergent states 
committed to the development of universities that should not in any way be regarded as 
‘second rate’. However, not only would the inbuilt safeguards prove no guarantee against 
future state interference, but the institutions’ British complexion ensured that a subsequent 
decolonising phase would later follow, as independent states sought curricula and facilities 
better equipped to meet the needs of developing states.51 
*** 
If we now turn from the development of higher education to that of public 
administration, we can see that the same understanding of the appropriate relationship of 
institutions to the state informed another aspect of the older universities’ involvement with 
institution-building at the end of empire: training a first generation of overseas public 
servants to succeed British colonial officials within the public services of new states who 
should be free to act without political interference. Within the British system the traditions of 
public service (established in the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan reforms, which recommended 
the creation of a permanent unified civil service recruited by competitive examination) 
included open entry by means of academic competition to positions within a service 
organised into grades according to function; a system of promotion based on merit and 
seniority; and adherence to a principle of political neutrality that meant officials retained their 
posts irrespective of their party political allegiances.52 In practice, colonial public services 
had deviated from the British model in several important respects: they were organised on 
racial rather than meritocratic lines, and they did not realise the ideals of bureaucratic 
neutrality,53 not least because until the advent of African self-government within Britain’s 
African colonies British public servants exercised executive authority.  
None the less while the Colonial Service differed from British public service 
traditions in this manner, we can again see ways in which British practice was distinct from 
continental European. Specifically, since 1926 new entrants to the Colonial Service had 
completed a training course at Oxford or Cambridge before taking up posts overseas in the 
service of individual colonies, rather than as in France or Belgium undergoing an initial 
training at dedicated colonial staff colleges.54 In British eyes this less centralised system, in 
which responsibility for training was devolved by the imperial state to the universities, was 
preferable to the staff college model and crucial in the development of civil servants in the 
British tradition.  As academics and administrators at Oxford and Cambridge argued in the 
early 1940s on the occasion of a major review of Colonial Service training,55 this was best 
done via a broad university-based post-graduate course, one that privileged the academic 
rather than the practical, and the generalist rather than the specialist.56 After the war the state 
sought to admit to these courses high-flying non-European students, especially Africans, who 
were initially destined for posts in the Colonial Service and later within bureaucracies in 
independent countries. In the 1950s British officials thought that studying at Oxbridge would 
be the best means of acculturating overseas civil servants to the values of a liberal education 
by broadening their outlook and horizons, and so shaping African middle-class entrants to 
administration along the lines of the generalists of the British civil service. 57 A nascent 
African administrative middle class was also perceived by some as vital not just to preventing 
administrative collapse in emergent states but to ensuring a pro-Western outlook.58  
As overseas administrators were admitted to these courses, initially in only small 
numbers, but by the early 1960s comprising the majority of those enrolled on them, key 
figures involved in their delivery argued for the continuation of a form of administrative 
training at Oxbridge. Via tuition in a wide range of subjects as part of a liberal education, 
overseas students would be equipped with the skills necessary to act as key mediators 
between politicians and experts in ways that would help maintain the autonomy of civil 
servants from governments. By this date the manpower needs of new African states were 
considerable and urgent, and the priority for overseas governments was naturally the 
development of local training in public administration. The British acknowledged as much in 
a major review of British assistance in the training of overseas public administrators by a 
committee established under the chairmanship of Lord Bridges, former head of the home civil 
service.59 Britain as well as other foreign countries and international organisations became 
one source of assistance in the development of new training institutes located in former 
colonies. A huge diaspora of British officials also remained in post in many former colonies 
or were seconded to new positions within the public services of new states under the auspices 
of the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, introduced in 1961 amidst fears that unless Britain did 
more to facilitate the continuation in post of British personnel there was a real danger of 
administrative collapse at least in East Africa.60 But Oxford academics successfully defended 
the case for the continuation of some form of training for an elite few overseas administrators 
at Oxbridge, arguing in their evidence submitted to the Bridges committee that,   
‘An indigenous civil service cannot just have handed on to it, ready-made, 
high standards of impartiality, reliability, incorruptibility and so on; it must establish 
them afresh for itself. For this its officers need to learn how to read and to think; how 
to present a case and debate it; how to weigh conflicting arguments and reach a 
decision; how to apply that decision with realism and moderation; and how to 
recognise and use the lessons of experience. …  nowhere can this be done better than 
in the older universities such as Oxford which, in effect, say to such students: ‘We 
cannot give you the answers to your future problems; but we can help you to acquire 
for yourselves the equipment with which you can usefully tackle them.  61 
Through lectures on governance and British history overseas students were taught key 
aspects of British political culture, including the ways in which authority within the British 
system rested with institutions which had gradually evolved. The gradual evolution of British 
institutions of government might serve, as the Oxford course supervisor put it, as the perfect 
antidote to ‘impatient and perfectionist political ambitions’.62 Sir Ivor Jennings was among 
those lecturing to these administrative cadets at Cambridge in the 1950s; another means of 
educating students from a variety of African and other Commonwealth states in a British 
parliamentary and liberal tradition, which Jennings had already been instrumental in 
implanting in an Asian context.63 In the 1950s, conscious of the burdens that delivering one-
year courses imposed on the university, the authorities at Oxford debated whether they should 
continue to participate in administrative training. On balance they reflected that such courses 
represented an investment in the ‘people in whose hands lay the future of large areas of the 
Commonwealth’.64 Simultaneously at the request of several governments Oxford became 
involved from the 1950s in delivering bespoke courses for new diplomats within the new 
foreign services of Commonwealth states, which eventually developed into the University’s 
Foreign Service Programme. 
Nevertheless, such apparently disinterested statements of service and commitment to 
the emergent Commonwealth resided alongside individual and institutional self-interest. As 
Véronique Dimier argues, in the early and mid-twentieth century the association with the 
imperial services was a source of prestige for Oxford and Cambridge, and, until it was 
brought into the new post-war Devonshire training scheme, a source of resentment in London 
at the University of London’s exclusion from this role.65 There were material interests at 
stake too. For example, the universities received a stipend from first the Colonial Office, and 
later the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Ministry of Overseas Development, 
to deliver the colonial administrative service training and successor courses, generating 
income and funds to support academic specialisms. More abstractly, as academics and civil 
servants articulated a case in defence of the generalist tradition for the training, first, of 
Britain’s colonial officials, and subsequently, overseas public administrators, it seems likely 
that they were – consciously or unconsciously - intervening in contemporary discussions 
about the nature of the home civil service as the value of the generalist-amateur tradition and 
emphasis on ‘character’ increasingly came under attack in the light also of persistent worries 
about elitism in a system in which Oxbridge graduates were over represented. The British 
generalist tradition was increasingly in tension with a growing reliance on specialist 
knowledge, as well as a Keynesian approach to economic planning.66 In one of the most 
significant critiques Thomas Balogh expressly linked the home and overseas services, in 
arguing that a cultivation of ‘powers of dialectical argument only’ had had ‘devastating 
effects’ including in British colonies which lacked expertise in economic planning.67 In the 
1960s growing criticism led to the appointment of the Fulton Committee on the civil 
service.68  
British discussions about training overseas public administrators hence occurred 
against a backdrop in which views of what constituted best practice were changing. Both 
Oxford and Cambridge continued to offer a form of the administrative training course, but the 
generalist tradition was increasingly a handicap as Whitehall officials began expressing 
greater preference for vocational training. State funding for the courses was finally 
withdrawn from Oxford in 1969, while the Cambridge course, reconfigured in the 1970s as a 
course on development, survived until 1981.69 Africans who subsequently rose to the most 
senior positions within their own civil services were among course graduates. But even where 
they apparently subscribed to British administrative ideals, they might fall foul of 
governments hostile to a colonial inheritance and traditions of political neutrality.70 
*** 
  
If the universities are an obvious place in which to locate the impact of imperial 
liberalism, it also registered in some less likely quarters. In summer 1943 a month after 
Oliver Stanley identified advancement towards self-government as the aim of British colonial 
policy, Montagu Norman, longstanding governor of the Bank of England, complaining to 
Stanley about Colonial Office proposals made in relation to colonial currency boards, turned 
Stanley’s recent liberal rhetoric against him. ‘I am especially disappointed’, Norman wrote in 
response to Stanley’s refusal to accept one of his proposals, ‘because what I suggested 
seemed to me at best a step in the direction of democracy; and it is surprising to me to find 
such a step refused when you in particular are beating the democratic drum in the colonies’.71 
In question was whether there should be representatives with local business and financial 
knowledge on the London-based regional boards which issued and managed colonial 
currencies; Norman believed there should. Raymond Kershaw, an Australian economist, and 
since 1935 an adviser to the Bank’s governors, deplored what he perceived as a Colonial 
Office tendency to ‘neglect the view of local interest in the interests of alleged centralised 
efficiency’. In contrast the Colonial Office worried about the politics of selecting local 
representatives and feared also that this might entail the appointment of a ‘native’, at least in 
West Africa.72 There was an ambiguity to Norman’s words: whereas the Colonial Office saw 
the appointment of representatives of ‘local’ interests on the currency boards as likely to lead 
to the inclusion of African members, there is no evidence that Norman necessarily understood 
‘local’ as anything other than the co-option of Britons engaged in business in the colonies. 
For our purposes what is most relevant here is what Norman’s intervention reveals of his own 
understanding of the appropriate relationship of institutions to the state. As Norman had 
argued in correspondence a few weeks before with Sir George Gater, the permanent under-
secretary of state at the Colonial Office, what the Colonial Office proposed seemed to 
‘foreshadow a condition in which there will be all State and no citizens, and certainly no 
citizens having a responsible share in the operations of the State’.73 In private Norman 
condemned the move as ‘undemocratic – worthy of Nazi – although the Col. [sic] Office is 
waving the flag of democracy in most countries’.74 Just as would later be the case with 
discussions over the generalist tradition and the public services, Norman’s perspective was 
surely shaped by his own recent domestic experience of the  gradual subordination of the 
Bank’s control over monetary policy to the Treasury as ideas about the desirability of central 
bank autonomy shifted as a result of a Keynsian emphasis on the role of the state in economic 
management.  
After the Second World War, this view of the importance of the independence of 
institutions from the state was reflected in the Bank’s approach towards the establishment of 
new central banking institutions in Britain’s colonies and former colonies. The Bank of 
England, like the universities, became involved in the provision of forms of technical 
assistance to new states, albeit in this instance as a result of its own initiative rather than 
under the auspices of any government department. Existing accounts of the Bank during 
decolonisation emphasise its resistance to developing new currencies and central banks, and 
focus on its priority of promoting the sterling area and sterling’s role as an international 
trading and reserve currency.75 But once in the mid-1950s it became obvious that the Bank 
could no longer profitably resist the development of institutions demanded by colonial 
politicians, as well as increasingly advocated by the World Bank,76 the Bank sought to 
exercise as much oversight as possible over the creation of new financial institutions in 
emergent states. The Bank provided advisers who drafted founding statutes for some of the 
new African central banks, as well as seconding its own staff to fill senior positions in them, 
and also inaugurated a short training course for Commonwealth central bankers in London.77 
In these various activities what we might rightly see as a form of financial imperialism also 
resided alongside a more abstract and cultural understanding of what ‘good banking’ meant 
in the context of a British liberal tradition.  
In 1946 the Bank of England had itself been nationalised.78 But notwithstanding its 
change in status, Bank officials nevertheless remained committed to the principle of central 
bank autonomy and -- just as with the universities and the civil service -- distinct 
understandings of the state and its relation to civil society shaped the Bank of England’s 
approach to its role in emergent states at the end of empire. A fundamental principle guiding 
the actions of their senior personnel as they advised on the statutes for which new central 
banks were based was that new banks should be as independent as possible of their 
governments.79 Statutes for new banks in West and Central Africa drafted by Bank of 
England advisers therefore gave no powers to governments to direct the banks’ affairs.80 In 
East Africa, where the Bank was unable to exercise the same level of oversight over the 
development of new central banks as it had in West Africa, officials nevertheless also sought 
where they could to promote this model of central banking.81  
In this respect the Bank’s views increasingly collided with those of other international 
experts and reflect specific British approaches. After the war American experts attached to 
the Federal Reserve, who had previously cleaved to the same liberal financial orthodoxy as 
those at the Bank of England, prioritising external currency stability, now adopted an 
alternative approach, seeking to strengthen the capacity of national governments to pursue 
policies geared towards domestic monetary goals.82 The American approach was premised on 
the idea that central banks could serve as engines of economic development in new states, 
including through their ability to advance money to their governments.  The British on the 
other hand feared that if new governments had control over the banks they would raid them 
for funds to pay for expensive development projects, thereby fuelling inflation and damaging 
the prestige and stability of their currencies.83 This had happened in the case of the Bank of 
Ceylon after the Ceylonese government turned to American experts to advise on the 
formation of their central bank as they sought to free themselves from what they saw (in 
many ways rightly) as the imperialism of the Bank of England. Opened in 1950, the Bank of 
Ceylon followed American models, and quickly became a source of credit to the 
government.84 Similar concerns lay behind the Bank of England’s preference to secure a 
separation of commercial and central banking functions; this also differed from American 
approaches since the latter anticipated that to facilitate economic development new banks in 
developing economies might have to be prepared to engage in direct lending. 85   
As English bankers engaged with questions of financial devolution within the 
emergent Commonwealth this adherence to what they perceived as ‘best practice’ co-existed 
with a set of more self-interested motives. As Peter Cain and A.G. Hopkins argue in relation 
to the interwar years, when the Bank had also been engaged in the development of new 
central banks, in this case in the dominions, India, and South America, central banks formed 
on an English model and permitted to function free from state interference were more likely 
to accept guidance from the Bank of England.86 Most significantly, in the 1950s and early 
1960s the Bank attached overriding importance to upholding sterling as a reserve currency 
and the mechanisms of the  sterling area (to which African members were of increasing 
importance as older Commonwealth states began to draw down their sterling holdings).87 
Central banks under the control of independent African governments, elected to office amidst 
hopes that they would deliver ambitious development plans, were more likely to turn to 
sterling reserves to fund development schemes as well as to diversify their holdings away 
from sterling.  
But rather than rely on such mechanisms Bank of England officials resorted to more 
direct ways of protecting the Bank’s interests. For example, in drawing up the statutes of the 
new central banks of Ghana and Nigeria, the Bank of England’s John Loynes built in a 
requirement that the banks keep a majority of their reserves in sterling, British government 
securities or gold held in London.88 In the Ghanaian case he even specified a fixed maximum 
fiduciary issue (that is, the limit to the issue of currency not backed by reserves) that could 
only be changed by the country’s new parliament. In this and other ways he hoped to have 
created a bank that was not ‘too dangerous’.89 It seems likely that Loynes understood 
‘dangerous’ not just in terms of a potential threat to British interests, but also in relation to the 
possible risks to the stability of Ghana’s currency, and, by extension, to its ability to attract 
foreign investment that a departure from conservative approaches to monetary policy might 
entail. Even so, while the British sought to enshrine central bank independence from 
successor governments, they simultaneously sought to ensure the protection of British 
interests in ways that compromised the ability of the new banks to operate in an autonomous 
fashion and which were likely to generate tensions between the new banks and postcolonial 
African governments.     
These more selfish objectives go a long way towards explaining the importance the 
Bank also attached to training a new class of Commonwealth central bankers and its 
willingness to second staff to fill posts in new banks. 90  By working with, and providing 
tuition to, Commonwealth bankers, it hoped to embed some attachment to sterling and the 
sterling area. But, in this instance too, these objectives are difficult to disentangle from a 
political liberal agenda. For via their training activities, Bank officials hoped to cultivate a 
class of African professional bankers who might take their place in international banking 
networks and contribute to the development of Western politically liberal systems. As one 
British banker seconded to work in Nigeria’s new central bank observed, in relation to his 
Nigerian colleagues, ‘once the middle class becomes sufficiently distinct to exercise an effect 
on public opinion and politics’ it would help secure the country’s future. 91 The Bank’s 
Commonwealth course proved perhaps surprisingly durable, not least because of sustained 
demand from bankers in new states eager to make use of all training opportunities available 
to them. This was the case despite the fact that there was some suspicion of the Bank of 
England and British influence, particularly among their governments that in some instances 
encouraged a departure from the banking model British bankers were so keen to implant.   
 
*** 
For a short period, then, as they engaged in an alternative form of constitution writing, 
drafting statutes and legal instruments for new institutions in Commonwealth African states, 
individuals acted in ways that reflected the traction that the liberal imperial idea had within 
sectors of British society. Although we need to see beyond individuals’ sometimes self-
justificatory and aggrandising claims about their commitment to, or role in, institutional 
development, liberalism was not simply a rhetorical device used to advance imperial 
objectives; rather it was also a conception of the British tradition that had been taught to 
individual Britons and which shaped their actions. In the eyes of Britons based in domestic 
institutions located on or beyond the borders of the state politically liberal systems entailed 
the construction of similar parastatal institutions similarly located, but not subordinated to, 
executive power. They perceived these as crucial accessories to the successful transfer of the 
Westminster model. These understandings of the appropriate relationship of institutions to the 
state reflected not just a broad Western liberal tradition but distinctive British ideas of the 
liberal state.  
It quickly became apparent, however, that the British legacy fell short of these 
ambitions. A failure to institute processes of institutional development and transfer 
sufficiently early in Africa created states that were not properly institutionalised. 92 Even 
where some scholars judge British values had successfully been transferred in relation to 
institutions in different sectors, they conclude that the societies and cultures and the different 
circumstances in which different countries attained independence were crucial in determining 
the survival or otherwise of British values.93 Furthermore, institutions that the British had 
conceived as crucial cogs in politically liberal states fell prey to political interference rather 
than serving as bulwarks against a transition away from a Westminster model. In the first of 
Britain’s African colonies to attain independence, Ghana, the country’s leader Kwame 
Nkrumah had instituted a one-party state and subordinated key institutions to it even as 
similar institutions were being constructed elsewhere in colonial Africa. Having first sought 
to circumvent the civil service by creating posts outside it (including a series of ‘district 
commissioners’ who would act as ministerial personal assistants), in 1960 he proceeded to 
change the public service commission as it had been established at independence. The 
following year he formed a branch of his party, the Convention People’s Party in the 
Establishment Secretariat.94 Between 1962 and 1963 both Ghana and Nigeria replaced the 
banking ordinances devised by a Bank of England adviser with new banking statutes that 
enabled them to diversify their holdings away from sterling.95 In Ghana these new 
instruments enabled the Bank of Ghana to advance long-term credit to the government and 
gave the government greater control over it.96 This was the very opposite of what the Bank of 
England had hoped, and the experience served as a salutary lesson that overseeing the 
founding statutes of new banks was no guarantee against unwelcome future developments. 
These departures from British models occurred even as Britain’s other African 
colonies were still progressing to independence and advisers adapted their approaches in the 
light of the West African developments.97 As we have already seen, a similar trend in relation 
to new African universities was equally chastening for Margery Perham.98 As Ian Maxwell 
later wrote, in these circumstances the IUC could do little  more than ‘give moral support’ or 
occasionally attempt to bring some pressure to bear via informal channels.99 Developments in 
this sector nevertheless led Eric Ashby to reflect on the lessons to be learned if autonomy was 
to be restored or, in the case of future institutions, ensured. Sir Ivor Jennings offered one 
insight: speaking in 1948 he noted that Ceylonese experience suggested that – however 
counterintuitive – the inclusion of representatives of state legislatures on university governing 
bodies might in fact be the best means of ensuring university autonomy. Others also 
speculated as to whether the construction of institutions detached from the state in line with a 
British liberal tradition was not the problem rather than the solution. T.H. Silcock, drawing 
on his experience of universities in South-East Asia questioned whether the French model in 
which university staff were civil servants while still having academic freedom might not be 
better.100  
More widely, although generalisation across so many countries and sectors is 
difficult, attempts to replicate the relative autonomy of institutions from the state and thereby 
to implant a distinctly British model of a politically liberal system, created institutions that 
might not only be viewed as ‘colonial’ but sometimes regarded with suspicion as alternative, 
and potentially competing, sources of power by governments that demanded political loyalty 
rather than neutrality. As we have also seen British ambitions to develop institutions on 
liberal lines were in tension with British self-interest, resulting in in-built distortions and 
ambiguities that (whether intentionally or not) departed from the British tradition. As Ashby 
reflected with reference to the derogation from freedom in institutions he had helped develop, 
‘The patterns we have exported are not in fact the patterns we practise’.101 Contemporary 
Britons would probably not all have recognised this, but inevitably, institution building at the 
end of empire constituted a form of imperial liberalism rather than a liberal imperialism.   
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